On February 1, 2021, Myanmar’s military ousted the National League for Democracy (NLD), which had become Myanmar’ ruling party after winning the 2015 and 2020 general elections.
The attempted coup instigated widespread protests nationwide and prompted the establishment of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)—the body representing a group of NLD lawmakers and ousted members of parliament from other parties, both in exile and within Myanmar, who have formed the National Unity Government, often referred to as a government in exile or a parallel government.
This article aims to examine the challenges the CRPH confronts in legitimising its authority amid the prevailing chaotic circumstances, as well as its efforts to be transparent and accountable
Myanmar’s political background and current governance
Myanmar has been grappling with persistent challenges to its state and nation-building efforts since its independence from Britain in 1948, marked by ongoing ethnic conflict and the military’s involvement in politics. A military coup in 1962 abruptly terminated civilian rule, ushering in a period of restricted discourse on representative democracy until the eruption of the 1988 uprising, characterised by marches and protests against the government. Military regimes dominated from 1988 to 2010, further solidified by the 2008 Constitution, which entrenched the political leadership role of the Myanmar military. This was followed by a gradual reintroduction of democratic governance structures in 2011 and the general elections in 2015 resulted in democratic rule by the NLD until February 2021.Following the attempted coup, a complex governing situation has emerged with different bodies claiming authority.
The military junta, known as the State Administration Council—which has been ruthlessly crushing peaceful protesters and opposition groups—faces widespread opposition from ethnic armed organisations it was fighting even before the attempted coup and ordinary citizens who have organised militias. The State Administration Council is not in control of large parts of Myanmar. The military junta does not recognise the CRPH or the NUG and reportedly declared the CRPH and the NUG as terrorist organisations on May 8, 2021.
As noted above, the CRPH is a body which has formed the National Unity Government (NUG). The NUG includes a fighting force, the People’s Defence Force (PDF), opposing the military. It has been recognised informally by several western governments as Myanmar’s government in exile.
The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) also plays an influential role in the post-coup governance of Myanmar. Since its unofficial formation on March 8, 2021, NUCC members have expanded their powers from an advisory role, and according to the second version of the Federal Democracy Charter, it currently holds a leading political role. CRPH members are involved in the functions of both the NUCC and the NUG.
The CRPH’s efforts to assert its legitimacy as the law-making body representing people of Myanmar
The emergence of the CRPH marked a significant political response to the attempted military coup in Myanmar. On February 5, 2021, 298 parliamentarians convened the inaugural emergency session of the third term of the Hluttaw Session via video-conference, establishing the CRPH. Legitimately elected MPs in the 2020 general elections (constituting 63 percent of the House of Representatives and the House of Nationalities) participated, with additional support from absent MPs who conveyed their endorsement through signed letters. This collective authorisation empowered the CRPH to undertake parliamentary functions, encompassing legislative, oversight, and representation duties, alongside engagement with international parliamentary bodies. On February 7, 2021, the CRPH issued a momentous statement condemning the attempted coup as a ‘criminal act’ and formally dismissed the State Administration Council and its cabinet, citing illegality and unconstitutional actions.
The CRPH outlined its political vision on March 5, 2021, to establish a federal democratic union. The fourfold vision includes ending the military dictatorship, the unconditional release of all unlawful detainees including President U Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi repealing the 2008 Constitution; and drafting a new Constitution based on a federal system.
By using its legitimacy as a representative body of the union parliament (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) composed of elected members from the 2020 general elections, the CRPH declared the establishment of the National Unity Government on April 16, 2021, which has been passing laws that can support the revolutionary forces. Mahn Win Khaing Than, the Prime Minister of the National Unity Government, stated that the CRPH would ‘attempt to legislate the required laws so that the people have the right to defend themselves’ and that public administration would be handled by an ‘interim people’s administration team’. Among the most important official statements issued by the CRPH was its opposition to military junta decrees, such as the Conscription Law. The CRPH has sought to enhance its legitimacy by actively seeking international support. During the first session of Union Parliament, several observers, including diplomats from the embassies of Denmark, Sweden, the USA, and the Czech Republic, were in attendance, as reported by the CRPH. International solidarity and cooperation are core functions of the CRPH, and it has been able to gain international recognition through increased interactions with international organisations and governments. The CRPH and NUG are actively reaching out to international allies for support, with advocacy groups in countries such as Australia and Norway offering support. Moreover, members of the CRPH are also engaging in advocacy to secure international recognition for both the CRPH and the National Unity Government, including a meeting with the US State Department and the European Parliament.
However, its legitimacy is challenged by a lack of diversity, which was present in the democratically elected NLD government, especially relating to its limited representation of ethnic minority groups. The CRPH and the NUG have been criticised by some members of the National Unity Consultative Council for being dominated by the Bamar ethnic group and members of the NLD. There are ongoing significant historical grievances and mistrust between Bamar and non-Bamar ethnic groups, as well as between non-Bamar ethnic groups, in Myanmar. Some political analysts and activists argue that the democratically elected NLD failed to effectively reconcile ethnic groups and were unable to hold abusive military commanders or soldiers accountable for atrocities against civilians during armed conflicts in Chin, Kachin, Karen, Rakhine, and Shan States, including complicity in the Rohingya genocide.
In early 2021, CRPH took steps to broaden its composition, admitting two MPs from ethnic parties on February 10 and three additional members on April 26. Some CRPH members have assumed ministerial roles in the National Unity Government, which is primarily based on a parliamentary form of government that allows legislative members to also serve in the executive branch, possibly in response to challenges they have encountered. Compared to the CRPH, the National Unity Government is more inclusive, comprising leaders from various political movements, including Ethnic Resistance Organisations, not just the NLD. Despite criticisms that the NUG is dominated by the Bamar ethnicity and the NLD party, it includes 53 percent non-Bamar ministers and 38 percent ministers who are members of the NLD party. The composition of the NUG reflects a diversity of representatives in terms of gender, ethnicity, and regional backgrounds, aiming to ensure broad representation and a more equitable decision-making process on various issues.
CRPH’s efforts towards transparency and accountability
Despite a very difficult operating environment, the CRPH has made significant efforts to make its activities transparent. Information about the CRPH’s activities are available through its official website, YouTube channel named ‘crph myanmar’, and Facebook page titled ‘Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw – CRPH’.
The official website of the CRPH provides information regarding its 12 committees, descriptions of six plenary sessions, legislation, international relations, and publications. These main features, seen on the landing page of the site, reveal that respective committees work on relevant issues including financial affairs, National Unity Consultative Council matters, education, security and defence, international relations, and others. All publications of the CRPH, including statements, speeches, newsletters, reports, news, and press releases, are uploaded to the official site with both HTML text and downloadable options for documents. Figures regarding the numbers of visitors to the website are not publicly known.
At the time of publication there were 159 video files uploaded to the CRPH’s YouTube channel, including videos on plenary sessions, and media interviews of CRPH members. Videos that are popular on its YouTube channel receive reactions in the thousands; and the CRPH’s YouTube channel attracts more viewers than the Myanmar Union Parliament channel did before the 2021 attempted coup.
The CRPH’s Facebook page includes live broadcasting of daily news from media outlets such as Public Voice Television and Radio NUG, information about the meetings and activities of CRPH members, and fundraising and rallying activities that support various revolutionary actors. The official Facebook page has received 1.9 million likes and has 2.1 million followers. Also, the CRPH’s spokesperson, [U] Sithu Maung, engages with Myanmar local media as well as the BBC and Voice of America programs to help public understanding of their actions and decisions.
Challenges to the CRPH’s activities amid the chaotic political environment
The CRPH serves two primary functions as a revolutionary parliament. It carries out the typical functions of a parliament, such as issuing public statements and passing laws, while also supporting the ‘spring revolution’ aimed at ending military dictatorship. This support involves coordinating fundraising activities and organising both civil and armed resistance efforts.
While undertaking its responsibilities, the CRPH faces challenges from the military junta and within the National Unity Consultative Council.
The military junta exerts authoritative control through legal and political constraints, threats of violence, and efforts to undermine or suppress CRPH activities and influence. The main challenge is security of the CRPH and others involved in anti-military activity. The junta has committed extrajudicial killings of political detainees or prisoners opposing the 2021 attempted coup. These necessitate CRPH members to be mindful of their personal security and those who support them in relation to their involvement in resistance movements, especially for those living inside Myanmar. The military junta also arrests activists reportedly connected to the CRPH, NUG, and affiliated organisations, and confiscates their homes and other property. These actions undermine personal safety and pose significant obstacles to maintaining transparency and accountability within the movement. Fear of reprisal and the need for secrecy hinder open operations and free communication about activities and decisions.
Simultaneously, challenges relating to the powerful role of the National Unity Consultative Council, result in differing viewpoints and strategic disagreements, hinder unified decision-making and operational cohesion. The collaboration of revolutionary forces in forming the National Unity Consultative Council—including elected members of parliaments, political parties, civil society organisations, ethnic resistance organisations; and interim state/federal unit representatives and ethnic-based organisations/councils—paves the way for collective leadership. But the current governance and accountability framework, and how the CRPH, the NUG and the NUCC interact with each other, is complex and evolving. For instance, in the first version of the Federal Democracy Charter, the CRPH is accountable to the Union Parliament (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) whereas the second version of the Charter suggests that the CRPH shall be accountable to the NUCC and People’s Assembly. Similarly, the accountability of NUG shifts from the CRPH in the first version of the Charter to the NUCC and People’s Assembly in the second version.
Conclusion
The CRPH is operating in revolutionary circumstances and the roles it has assumed go beyond the typical functions of a parliament. Despite facing ruthless attacks from the military junta for more than three years and navigating how to carry out its mandated duties under the collective leadership of National Unity Consultative Council, the CRPH effectively uses social media platforms and its official website to mobilise resistance forces and provide commendable transparency of its parliamentary functions. Within the continuing context of the threat of the military junta and difficulty making decisions under the collective leadership of National Unity Consultative Council, better transparency and accountability mechanisms of the CRPH, as the legislative branch of the government mandated by people in 2020 elections, cannot be implemented unless the overthrow of military regime is successful and/or the governance structures of the collective leadership of the National Unity Consultative Council are revisited.
*The author’s name is a pseudonym
Image: Three finger salute for Myanmar. Photo by Gayatri Malhotra on Unsplash.
