The KNU, a non-state governing actor in Myanmar’s Karen State, aspires to become a self-governing unit within a possible future federal democratic union.
Keywords: KNU, Kawthoolei, Karenni, Myanmar, Karen State, political legitimacy
The nationwide peaceful protests and civil disobedience held in Myanmar soon after the 2021 military coup have, amid ongoing military violence, transformed into complex and protracted political and armed struggles. The people of Myanmar are not only fighting to restore the pre-coup status quo. Rather, broader work is underway to overcome nearly 80 years of nation-building failures and many pro-democratic alliances have been working towards a vision of a federal democratic union from the ground up.
In June 2023, the Karen National Union (KNU)—a long-standing ethnic resistance organisation turned sub-state governing actor—officially announced its intention to establish a multi-ethnic and democratic ‘Kawthoolei’ constituent unit as part of a federal democratic union. This article examines how the KNU is attempting to build Kawthoolei as a legitimate and viable sub-state actor.
The concept of legitimacy has long been contested and interpreted differently
Among the most influential theories is that of sociologist Max Weber who defines legitimacy as the belief that an authority has the right to rule. Building on this, sociologist David Beetham argues that legitimacy depends on the exercise of power in accordance with established rules, the justifiability of those rules based on shared belief and the consent of the governed. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama further emphasises that effective political authority requires both administrative capacity and legitimacy. Legitimacy can, at its core, be understood as the acceptance of an authority’s right to govern. Such acceptance does not depend solely on legal or constitutional foundations, which remain contested in the context of Myanmar, but also on shared beliefs, the consent of those being governed, and the authority’s ability to govern effectively.
Historical roots of the Karen movement
From the late 1940s until today, the KNU has arguably been one of the most significant political and armed resistance groups in Myanmar in terms of its manpower, territorial control, administrative establishment, and political leadership. Karen leaders have been involved in political and diplomatic work toward achieving an independent state of ‘Kawthoolei,’ with a proposed territorial boundary, since the period of British rule, which ended in January 1948. Significant peaceful protests for an independent Karen state were rejected and met with a violent crackdown, sparking the first armed rebellion post-independence in January 1949. The word ‘Kawthoolei’ later was associated with the Karen rebellion against central Burmese/Myanmar government and is largely avoided in daily usage in government-controlled areas.
In 1956, the KNU shifted its political goal from achieving an independent state to a self-governed state in a federal democratic union. Over decades of failed ceasefires and armed clashes, the KNU has been pushed back from the Yangon area toward the vast borderlands with Thailand populated by ethnic Karen. During the drafting of the 1974 Constitution, the then head of state U Ne Win removed the word ‘Kawthoolei.
The KNU as a governing authority
The KNU has evolved into a non-state governance actor in southeastern Myanmar, spanning the Myanmar government-designated Karen State (except Hpa-an City), plus parts of northern Mon State and eastern Bago and Tanintharyi regions where the ethnic Karen population has been predominant for centuries. Some fully KNU controlled areas have never been governed by the central government and have remained largely autonomous, where the only public services available to the local population are those provided by the KNU. These communities, often sharing the same cultural and linguistic affinity and aspiration for freedom, see the KNU as their legitimate government. There are also pockets of mixed controlled areas where no group has absolute control, and strongholds of the Myanmar military-aligned Karen militias (the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army and Karen Border Guard Force/Karen National Army) where there are notorious Chinese-led transnational cyber scam centres.
The KNU has a Constitution which divides its administrative jurisdiction into seven districts. There are four levels of governance: central, district, township and village tracts. Leaders serving at the higher levels are elected by delegates from the lower levels through Congress held at central and district level every four years, and decisions and policies are implemented by the lower levels. Between each Congress session, the Central Standing Committee acts as the legislative proxy. As such, the KNU shows a reasonable degree of legitimacy through representation. A feature of the KNU administration is its recognition of ‘Kaw’, Indigenous conserved territories across Kawthoolei, and its establishment of the Salween Peace Park, the Thawthi Taw-Oo Indigenous Park and the Pawklo Indigenous Stewardship Territory where Indigenous land is jointly governed by customary land owners, the KNU and civil society.
The KNU has 12 administrative departments, including education, health, tax and finance, defence, mining, agriculture, fisheries and livestock with a police force in its interior department. The judiciary is a separate and independent body with a Supreme Court, district courts, and township courts. There are also several multi-departmental committees focusing on land, displaced populations, economic issues, natural resources and environmental affairs.
The KNU also has two-armed wings: the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the main army, and the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), the local defence force. Each district has one KNLA brigade and keeps one KNDO battalion under its command to maintain the latter’s historical roots, and the KNLA Brigadier General automatically serves as the district’s Vice Chair, while the District Chair is an elected civilian. Civilian and military authorities are therefore closely integrated. However, the elected District Chair remains the senior civilian authority, reflecting an institutional commitment to civilian leadership under the KNU’s governance framework. The KNLA has emphasised military discipline, reflected in its established internal laws and regulations, and its formal commitments, made through NGO Geneva Call, on the protection of children in armed conflict and eliminating sexual violence and gender discrimination. Members receive basic military training as well as training in international human rights law and international humanitarian law. Members must also follow the KNU’s military manual on the handling of captured or surrendered enemy combatants in accordance with international humanitarian law.
Before the 2021 military coup, the KNU’s political goals were focused on the ceasefire negotiation process with less emphasis on strengthening governance (with the expectation that its administrative system would eventually converge with that of the central government once a political settlement was reached). However, the coup and the military’s extreme violence forced the KNU to abandon the peace process and they have pivoted toward establishing a self-governed state.
The KNU going forward
After 77 years, the KNU remains a politically and militarily strong opponent to the Myanmar military and is determined to pursue its political goal of achieving a Kawthoolei State within a genuine federal union. In doing so, the KNU is taking multiple approaches to gradually transform itself into a more inclusive and credible federal unit.
1. Establishing a Kawthoolei Government for the revolutionary period
The KNU began drafting the ‘Kawthoolei Charter’ in mid-2023, aiming to establish the foundation for a self-governed, multi-ethnic democratic Kawthoolei State. The drafting committee conducted rounds of consultations with KNU leaders at various administrative levels, as well as with Karen civil society organisations and representatives of minority groups, such as Mon, Pa’O, Shan and Bamar, living under its administration (authors’ interview with a KNU technical team member, October 2026). On 10 April 2026, the KNU announced the ratification of the Kawthoolei Charter establishing the Kawthoolei Consultative Council and the Kawthoolei Governing Council. There has been no official explanation so far about the composition, structure or workplan of either of the two bodies and the KNU has not yet made the ratified Kawthoolei Charter public despite its stated promise and widespread demands from civil society.
The authors’ interviews (in May 2025 and October 2026) with two KNU officials involved in the process indicate that the Charter designates four stakeholder groups to be represented in the Kawthoolei Consultative Council: representatives from KNU central and districts, members of parliament elected in the 2020 elections, non-Karen constituents, and youth and women’s organisations. Whether these stakeholder groups adequately represent the diversity of the Kawthoolei population remains questionable. The newly formed Kawthoolei Governing Council includes seven of the 12 existing administrative departments of the KNU administration plus a new department of women, youth and children. The KNU has not officially disclosed which seven departments these are or how they were selected, nor explained how their roles and responsibilities will differ from those of the remaining departments under the KNU administration. According to a KNU technical team member (Authors’ interview October 2026 the seven departments within the Governing Council are Education, Health, Finance, Agriculture, Defence, Transportation and Justice.
The ratified Charter, Kawthoolei Consultative Council and Kawthoolei Governing Council are the result of more than three years of consultations within the KNU and the designated stakeholder groups and represent an important step towards establishing the Kawthoolei Federal Unit through a bottom-up process. But information on the substance of the process is still quite limited and the process itself has not been transparent. For the KNU to galvanise public support, the public must be brought along through key steps in the process, giving them the opportunity to participate. It is equally important to engage and inform the international audience, external experts, and observers to garner recognition.
2. Strengthening existing governance
To date, the Karen Health and Social Welfare Department operates 92 hospitals/clinics and serves over 75,000 patients, while the Karen Education and Culture Department administers 1,633 secondary education schools with 10,984 teachers and around 135,981 students in the 2026-2027 academic year across the seven districts. There are also two teachers’ training colleges, and 10 Junior Colleges as well privately-run colleges, medical and nursing schools. In recent years the KNU has been focusing on promoting good governance and public services for 1.3 million people, according to its 2023 socio-economic household data. In 2024, led by the newly created Governance Strengthening and Capacity Building Committee, the KNU launched its first-ever Township Administrators’ Conference, followed annually since then. It has also recently launched official guides on governance and public administration and village administration and town planning.
The KNU has also worked on improving its justice system, which is often described as one of the most institutionalised among ethnic resistance organisations in Myanmar. Its hybrid model, combining customary law with KNU legislation, to some extent accommodates both the formal legal structures and local community practices. On 6 June 2026, the KNU Justice Department, headed by a female leader in her 30s, organised the first Kawthoolei Justice Forum, bringing more than 170 representatives from various sectors across Karen organisations aiming to establish a trusted, transparent, and uniform legal and judicial framework in Kawthoolei. Still, its justice system requires further development to effectively serve diverse communities within Kawthoolei.
3. The constitutional Kawthoolei State and a possible future federal democracy
While the Kawthoolei Charter has been devised in recent years for the revolutionary period, the drafting of the Kawthoolei State Constitution, which is meant to be a foundational legal document for the future, has been ongoing since the early 1990s. The drafting process was put on hold after 2010 when the then military regime held elections, transitioned to a quasi-civilian government and entered a ceasefire with major ethnic armed organisations, including the KNU. The constitution drafting work resumed in 2018 under the renamed Karen State Constitution Drafting Coordination Body, which included Karen political parties, ethnic armed organisations, and civil society organisations. The second draft was completed before the 2021 coup. The drafting body and the KNU resumed collaboration after the coup and worked closely to ensure consistency between the Kawthoolei Charter and the future Kawthoolei State Constitution. Both documents emphasise the inclusion of non-Karen communities and identify the KNU’s existing seven districts as the initial basis for Kawthoolei State, while allowing for future adjustments based on the wishes of local communities. A third draft of the Constitution was completed and submitted to the KNU for review in early 2025, and consultations with two KNU districts were held subsequently in the same year. In 2026, additional consultations were held with the remaining districts, as well as with the Central Executive Committee.
4. Armed resistance for security, self defence and territorial integrity
The Karen National Liberation Army and the Karen National Defence Organisation, together with allied resistance forces, have been at the forefront of resisting numerous attacks by the Myanmar military since the 2021 coup. In 2024 and 2025, the KNLA and allied forces had some significant victories, taking control of the full stretch of the Salween River border, the strategic trade town of Htee Khee (situated opposite Thailand’s Phu Nam Ron permanent border checkpoint in Kanchanaburi), the historic former headquarters at Manerplaw, and several other areas. It is only with the security and protection provided by the KNLA, KNDO and allied forces that the KNU can carry out and advance its administrative functions. Even so, no part of Kawthoolei or other resistance-controlled areas is safe from Myanmar military drone and air attacks. The Myanmar military intensified air strikes on resistance-controlled areas before and after its sham elections in late December 2025 and January 2026 and recaptured the strategic stretch of the Asian Highway near Myawaddy (opposite Mae Sot) and of Mawdaung, a border trade town opposite Thailand’s Singkhon Pass.
5. Alliance building with other pro-democratic actors
As has been the case in past decades, the KNU has been active in political alliance building in recent years. Soon after the coup, the KNU was one of the leading organisations in the formation of the National Unity Consultative Council, a national-level political coalition body that brought together an array of anti-coup pro-democracy groups, including ethnic resistance organisations, civil society organisations and elected MPs. The KNU was also involved in the drafting of the Federal Democracy Charter which served as the legal basis for the formation of the interim National Unity Government (NUG). Although the KNU did not appoint any representative to the NUG, it has been a leading member in developing the Articles of Federal Transitional Arrangement, a proposed constitutional framework for the transitional period. The KNU has also been a founding member of the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), officially launched on 30 March 2026. The SCEF is a crucial first step that brings together the long-standing ethnic administrations and the federal unit administrations formed after the coup. However, those opposing the military regime face a challenging diplomatic struggle, as many neighboring state leaders favour working with the military regime for economic stability.
Conclusion
The KNU is often viewed primarily through the lens of armed resistance, rather than through its nation- and state-building efforts in pursuit of a self-governing unit within a federal democratic union. It has been strengthening its existing governance to provide services to its constituents, developing a legal foundation for a post-conflict future, working to professionalise its military alongside other allied forces, and continuously seeking ways to coordinate and build cohesion with other governance actors, all of which are critical elements of legitimacy as a governing authority.
However, this work requires a more sophisticated communication strategy with clarity, transparency and responsiveness to changing geopolitical landscape and public needs. In addition, the KNU also faces a humanitarian crisis, complex cyber scam operations encroaching into their territories, military-aligned Karen militias with far greater manpower and resources, human resource constraints and geopolitical pressures. The KNU leadership needs more committed and competent workforce to effectively manage territorial control, public revenue, livelihoods, trade, natural resources, service delivery, inclusion and diversity management and the private sector.
Still, the KNU is an example of how a non-state actor in Myanmar is attempting to build a legitimate new political order amid ongoing attacks by the military regime. The bottom-up approach is building towards a federal democratic union, a fundamentally different path than that of past military regimes. The future of Myanmar will not depend on recycling the military-led administration, but on recognising and strengthening scores of political coalitions and inclusive state-building efforts in uncharted territory.
Naw Show Ei Ei Tun is an advocate, analyst and practitioner specialising in political economy, governance and inclusive development with a focus on Myanmar and cross-border affairs with over 20 years of experience. She has worked closely with a range of public, private and civil society stakeholders, including those in conflict areas. She has an M.A. in economics and international relations with a focus on Southeast Asia from the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University.
Naw Seablue Dah is a Program Officer for Special Projects at the School of Governance and Public Administration (SGPA). She holds an LL.M. in International Law and Global Governance from Tilburg University. Her work focuses on non-state governance, international humanitarian law, and cross-border governance, with a particular interest in the governance of the Karen National Union (KNU).
Image: A ‘Welcome to Kawthoolei’ sign in Mutraw District, 3 July 2024. Credit: Naw Show Ei Ei Tun.
