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《亚洲之声》播客
Ear to Asia podcast

亚洲各国政府如何在人工智能的利与弊之间寻找平衡
How governments in Asia juggle the pros and cons of AI

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The following is the transcript of a translated *Ear to Asia* podcast, originally in English. The translation and audio recreation into Chinese were undertaken by students of the [Master of Translation and Interpreting](#) from the Asia Institute at the University of Melbourne. All voices in the accompanying Chinese audio recording are of the student translators and not the original speakers. This work has been guided and overseen by Dr Anthony Williams from the Asia Institute, the University of Melbourne.

本文为《亚洲之声》(*Ear to Asia*) 播客中文版的逐字稿，原版为英文，由墨尔本大学亚洲研究院笔译与口译硕士生制作中文译文与译配音频，音频中所有人声均由学生译者配音，而非原版参与者。相关的翻译与录制工作在墨尔本大学亚洲研究院教师魏安天博士 (Dr Anthony Williams) 的指导下完成。

英文原版播客：<https://melbourneasiareview.edu.au/podcasts/how-governments-in-asia-juggle-the-pros-and-cons-of-ai>

Description: Governments across Asia are confronting a new kind of policy challenge — one that’s moving faster than most have ever had to legislate for. The astonishing speed of generative AI development has prompted both excitement and alarm in Asia’s capitals, where the potential for economic growth and national prestige is being weighed against serious questions about risk, regulation, and long-term control. In China, we’ve seen some of the world’s earliest binding regulations on generative AI, with policymakers steering innovation to align with stated political values. Japan, by contrast, has recently pivoted toward a “light touch” governance model — part of a wider shift in Asia that favours innovation-friendly oversight, even as public concerns about misinformation, data misuse, and algorithmic bias continue to mount. In other countries like India, Malaysia and South Korea, dedicated AI bodies have been established, but concrete legislation remains elusive. So what are Asian governments actually doing — and not doing — to shape the direction of this transformative technology? And how are they managing the balancing act between economic ambition and ethical caution? Professor Jeannie Paterson from Melbourne Law School and Professor Haiqing Yu from RMIT University join host Sami Shah to explore how Asia is balancing the risks and rewards of generative AI.

简介：亚洲各国政府正面临一种前所未有的政策挑战——人工智能（AI）的发展速度，远远超过了大多数立法的节奏。生成式 AI 的突飞猛进，让这些国家的政府在兴奋与担忧之间徘徊。生成式 AI 既被视为推动经济增长、提升国家形象的新引擎，也引发了关于风险、监管与长期控制的深层忧虑。中国是最早推出 AI 监管法规的国家之一，政府希望通过这些政策，引导人工智能的发展方向，让技术创新服务于国家既定的价值与目标。与此不同，日本政府近来选择了一种更为“轻监管”的治理模式——在鼓励创新和放宽管制之间寻找平衡，虽然公众对虚假信息、数据滥用以及算法偏见的担忧不断上升，但这一模式正在成为亚洲普遍出现的新趋势。在印度、马来西亚与韩国等国家，尽管已设立专门的 AI 管理机构，但真正意义上的立法仍然迟迟没有出台。那么，为了引导 AI 这一变革性技术的发展方向，亚洲各国政府究竟在采取哪些措施？又有哪些事情是没有做的？在经济发展的野心与伦理约束之间，他们如何找到平衡？本期播客的两位嘉宾——墨尔本大学法学院的珍妮·帕特森讲席教授（Professor Jeannie Paterson）和来自皇家墨尔本理工大学的于海青讲席教授（Professor Haiqing Yu）——与主持人萨米·沙（Sami Shah）一同探讨亚洲各国如何在生成式 AI 的利与弊之间寻找平衡。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

Hello, I'm Sami Shah, this is *Ear to Asia*.

大家好，我是萨米·沙。欢迎收听《亚洲之声》。

Jeannie Paterson | 珍妮·帕特森：

If you have a country that has a healthy legal system and active regulators who have expertise and resources, you actually can have a country that is very responsive to the risks of AI. And you see that happening in a number of countries across the region. They don't have AI laws, but they have laws about misinformation.

一个国家能不能妥善应对 AI 带来的风险，其实取决于它的法律和监管体系是否运作良好。如果法律体系够健全，监管机构又有专业知识和资源，那这个国家就能对 AI 风险作出及时、灵活的反应。在亚洲，我们已经看到不少这样的例子。它们或许还没有专门的人工智能法律，但已有针对虚假信息等问题的法规，也能发挥相似的作用。

Haiqing Yu | 于海青：

I don't hold a positive view on the global collaboration in AI governance, particularly given the increasing tension between the two AI superpowers and the delinking drive that has been going on for a few years. But I do hold a very hopeful view about Asia, the future of AI development is in Asia. It's in the global South.

说实话，我对全球范围内在人工智能治理上的合作并不太乐观。过去几年，两大 AI 强国之间的紧张关系不断加剧，“脱钩”的趋势也越来越明显，在这种环境下，要推动真正的国际协作确实不容易。不过我对亚洲的前景非常乐观。未来的人工智能发展重心，应该就在亚洲，也在全球南方。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

In this episode, how governments in Asia juggle the pros and cons of AI. *Ear to Asia* is the podcast from Asia Institute, the Asia research specialists at the University of Melbourne.

在本期节目里，我们来聊聊亚洲各国政府如何在人工智能的利与弊之间寻找平衡。《亚洲之声》是由墨尔本大学亚洲研究所制作的播客节目，聚焦亚洲地区的社会、政治与文化议题。

Across Asia and beyond, national governments are confronting a new kind of policy challenge, one that's moving faster than most have ever had to legislate for. The astonishing speed of generative AI development has prompted both excitement and alarm at the highest levels of government, where the potential for economic growth and national prestige is weighed against serious questions about risk, regulation and long-term control. In China, we've seen some of the world's earliest binding regulations on generative AI, with policymakers steering innovation to align with stated political values. Japan, by contrast, has recently pivoted towards a light-touch governance model, part of a wider shift in Asia that favours innovation friendly oversight, even as public concerns about misinformation, data misuse and algorithmic bias continue to mount. In other countries like India, Malaysia and South Korea, dedicated AI bodies have been established, but concrete legislation remains elusive. So, what are Asian governments actually doing and not doing to shape the direction of this transformative technology? How are they managing the balancing act between economic ambition and ethical caution? Are emerging voluntary frameworks like the G7's Hiroshima AI process enough to build public trust and international norms, or are they just well-meaning but toothless tigers?

放眼亚洲乃至更广的地区，各国政府正面临一种前所未有的政策挑战——人工智能的发展速度，远远超过了大多数立法的节奏。生成式 AI 的突飞猛进，让各国政府在兴奋与担忧之间徘徊。它既被视为推动经济增长、提升国家形象的新引擎，也引发了关于风险、监管和长期控制的深层忧虑。中国是最早推出 AI 监管法规的国家之一。政府希望通过这些政策，引导人工智能的发展方向，让技术创新服务于国家既定的价值与目标。日本政府近来选择了一种更为“轻监管”的治理模式，这也是亚洲普遍出现的新趋势——在鼓励创新和放宽管制之间寻找平衡。与此同时，在印度、马来西亚和韩国等国家，公众对虚假信息、数据滥用以及算法偏见的担忧不断上升。各国虽然陆续成立了专门的 AI 管理机构，但真正意义上的立法仍然迟迟没有出台。那么，亚洲各国政府究竟在做些什么？又有哪些事情还没做？他们如何在经济发展的野心与伦理约束之间找到平衡？至于七国集团提出的“广岛 AI 进程”等自愿性框架，真的能建立公众信任、推动国际规范吗？还是说，它们终究只是好心却无力的“纸老虎”？

Joining me to explore these dynamics are Professor Jeannie Paterson of the Melbourne Law School, who researches consumer and data protection law surrounding emerging digital technologies. She also serves as director of the University of Melbourne's Centre for AI and Digital Ethics, and Professor Haiqing Yu of RMIT University's School of Media and Communication, whose work looks into the socio political and economic impact of digital media in China, Australia and the Asia Pacific. She is also a Chief Investigator for the ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision Making and Society. Welcome to *Ear to Asia*, Jeannie and Haiqing.

本期请到的两位嘉宾是：来自墨尔本大学法学院的珍妮·帕特森教授（Professor Jeannie Paterson）。她关注新兴数字技术中的消费者权益与数据保护，也是墨尔本大学“人工智能与数字伦理中心”的主任。还有来自墨尔本皇家理工大学的于海青教授（Professor Haiqing Yu）。她研究中国、澳大利亚和亚太地区的数字媒体与社会变迁，同时也是澳大利亚研究理事会“自动化决策与社会卓越研究中心”的首席研究员。

Jeannie Paterson | 珍妮·帕特森：

Hi, Sami.

嗨，萨米。

Haiqing Yu | 于海青：

Hi, Sami.

嗨，萨米。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

Well, let's start by looking at the concerns or even things that encourage national governments more generally amid this tsunami of generative AI development. So to what extent is the rapid progress in generative AI welcomed by those at the commanding heights of national government—Haiqing?

那我们就从这里开始聊吧。面对这股生成式 AI 的浪潮，各国政府的态度可以说是又期待、又担心——既看到机会，也意识到风险。总体来说，政府高层对 AI 的迅速发展，是更欢迎它，还是更警惕它呢？海青，你怎么看？

Haiqing Yu | 于海青：

This is a very broad question. It really depends what country, what national governments you are looking at. Some governments view AI with a very positive view, thinking AI is very useful too, such as China, and then there are countries that would view AI with caution, very wary of this evil aspect. So they take different approach to AI governance. So in the Chinese context, which I'm familiar with, we can think about how the Chinese government views generative AI as a significant technological advancement with both opportunities and challenges in general.

这个问题挺宽泛的，其实要看你指的是哪个国家。有些政府，比如中国，特别看好人工智能，觉得它能帮上很多忙。但也有些国家比较谨慎，甚至有点担心 AI 会带来麻烦。所以，不同国家在 AI 治理上采取的做法也不一样。就拿我熟悉的中国来说，政府通常把生成式 AI 看作是一项重要的技术突破，它既带来了许多机会，也伴随着风险和挑战。

As I said, it's a good thing, partly because China is a kind of a latecomer to this technology, but not that late compared to the internet. So generative AI has provided China with a latecomer opportunity to catch up with the US and to drive innovation and economic growth.

就像我之前说的，这其实是件好事。因为在这项技术上，中国算是后来者，但如果跟当年追互联网相比，这次也没有落后太多。所以生成式 AI 给了中国一个“后发先至”的机会，不但有望追上美国，还能推动创新和经济发展。

And secondly, I would also say, generally AI is viewed by the Chinese government as an effective tool and a geopolitical asset to strengthen China's leadership in tech, economic, military, governance and standard setting, as well as soft power projection, while it's particularly open-source large language models.

另外，从整体来看，中国政府一直把 AI 视为一项非常有用的工具，也是一种重要的地缘政治资产。它能帮助中国在科技、经济、军事、治理、标准制定等等领域提升领导力，同时也能增强国家的软实力，特别是在开源大模型方面，中国是非常重视的。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

Jeannie, when you compare China to a place like, for example, Singapore; is there the same enthusiastic embrace with certain guardrails, or is there a far more cautious approach being taken? 珍妮，那如果拿中国跟新加坡比较的话，比如说，新加坡对待 AI 的态度是不是像中国一样积极？还是说，他们相对更保守一些？

Jeannie Paterson | 珍妮·帕特森:

Well, I think that Singapore in particular, but the ASEAN group in general, are really interesting in terms of their approach. I think there's a great deal of interest in the region, in the opportunities that AI can give, but a great deal of anxiety about the threats from AI, threats from third parties, misuse, misinformation and also the uncertainties that come with reliance on that technology, particularly since that group of nations aren't building the underlying models themselves. They're largely reliant on US or China models, which increases or introduces a new vulnerability. If you're going to make that the basis of a whole lot of efficiency changes in your economy.

我觉得新加坡，其实放大一点说整个东盟地区，他们在这方面的做法真的非常值得关注。他们对 AI 带来的机会很感兴趣，但同时，对 AI 的风险也特别焦虑。比如第三方滥用、错误信息传播，还有过度依赖这种技术带来的各种不确定性。尤其是，这些国家自己并不开发基础模型，他们在很大程度上还是依赖美国或者中国的技术。这就等于说，把自己的技术命脉交到别人手上，到时候整个系统都要靠别人，就很被动，也更容易受制于人，这也是他们顾虑最大的地方。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙:

What positive potential are they seeing in these countries? You know, is it economic or is it security, defense related, technological?

那这些国家，他们觉得 AI 最有价值的地方在哪儿？比如说，是经济方面，还是安全、防务，或者科技层面？

Jeannie Paterson | 珍妮·帕特森:

I think it's all of the above. So if you look at uses of AI across the region, it's being rolled out in a variety of ways. So, that sort of increasing administrative efficiency that all of us are finding at the moment from our use of generative AI, you know, retrieving information, summarizing documents, drafting emails. The insights from data can help government policy and also companies. So with planning anything from healthcare needs, to natural disaster planning, to improving education or the rollout of new education initiatives. But also defense. So AI is useful for actually responding to cyber-attacks. And a lot of companies, countries in the region are making use of or want to make use of facial recognition technology to reduce terrorists and other foreign actor interference.

我觉得各方面都有。如果你去看整个地区 AI 的应用，是非常多样化的。首先，在行政管理上，AI 正在提升效率，就像我们现在用生成式 AI 查资料、总结文件、写邮件一样，这些工具都能辅助政府和企业运转得更顺。另外，通过 AI 分析数据，还能帮助政府做政策规划，企业做决策。可以用在各种领域，从医疗资源配置，到自然灾害预警，再到教育改革或新的教育项目的实施都能用上。不止这些，防务方面也很关键。像 AI 就能用来应对网络攻击。而且，这些国家里很多已经在用了，或者想用人脸识别技术，减少恐怖袭击的威胁，也防止外国势力干预。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙:

And then there is the threat side of things, Haiqing. What threats does China perceive AI brings with it?

风险方面呢，海青？中国觉得会带来哪些威胁？

Haiqing Yu | 于海青：

Well, I agree with Jeannie's points, about when it comes to opportunities and challenges, because as a Chinese term, “wēijī” (危机) the term meaning “challenges but opportunity”. They all come together—we can't separate it.

我同意珍妮刚才说的。中文里有个词叫“危机”，意思就是“挑战和机会并存”，两者是分不开的。

When it comes to generative AI, the Chinese government has always been emphasizing content moderation. It's mainly about ideological alignment. So ideological alignment, social stability has always been the core, whether it's from the internet, the so-called internet era to the platform era. And now we come to talk about AI and generative AI, all the logic has always been the same to ensure that whether whatever technologies that platforms use or tech companies implement, particularly facing the consumer side, they have to comply with national policy priorities such as adhering to the core socialist values, which we can talk about in a minute. But then social stability, the government's grip of the economic, social and ideological development and as well as geopolitical intention, particularly vis-a-vis the US in the AI rivalries globally.

说到生成式 AI，中国政府一直很重视内容管理，核心是意识形态的一致性。意识形态对齐和社会稳定一直都是核心原则，不管是互联网时代还是平台时代，逻辑都是一样的。无论平台使用什么技术，或者科技公司推出什么应用，尤其是面向消费者的，都必须符合国家政策优先事项，比如要坚持社会主义核心价值观，我们待会儿可以具体聊一下这个。同时，政府也要保持对经济、社会和意识形态发展的掌控，还要考虑地缘政治意图，在全球 AI 竞争中与美国的博弈，也都是重要考量。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

Does this change then from this style of governance, you know, the constraints that governments operate under when seeking to regulate generative AI? Is that different for a liberal government versus an authoritarian government? So China, for example, are their constraints different from a place like India might have?

那说到监管生成式 AI，各国会不会有不一样的做法，面对的限制是不是也不同？自由政府和专制政府会有什么差别吗？比如中国和印度，情况会有什么不同？

Haiqing Yu | 于海青：

Yes. We can see very different approaches to AI or technological governance. Because when we think about AI, the Chinese regulatory philosophy, as I said before, the core focus has been on ideological security and state control. That is, I must ally with the socialist values.

是的。我们了解到各个国家采取了不同的人工智能或技术治理的方式。关于人工智能，就像我们之前提到的，中国监管理念的核心主要在意识形态安全和国家控制上。也就是说，人工智能的发展必须与社会主义核心价值观保持一致。

But when you think about the US, the US is very much kind of market driven industry self-regulation approach. So innovation first plus limited federal oversight. And then you think about the EU, of course, that takes a very different approach as well. We can see the US emphasis on the fundamental rights. And there's an emphasis also on risk mitigation particularly when it comes to privacy and the bias, as we can see, through EU AI act, which was the world's first comprehensive AI law. And I don't think any other country has had that such kind of comprehensive AI law yet. Jeannie can clarify that for me. And then another difference between China and other countries might come to the enforcement. So making having a philosophy is one thing. Having a guideline is one thing. You know, rolling out the law is another thing, but more importantly is the enforcement. China has a very strict pre-approval enforcement of those different kind of laws and regulations. So it requires security assessment before the content or the large language models or algorithms are launched rather than the ex-post enforcement that we can see in other parts of the world.

但是对于美国而言，他们采取的是市场驱动和行业自我监管的方式，也就是创新第一加上有限的联邦监督。让我们再把目光放在欧洲。欧洲当然也采取了全然不同的方式进行治理。欧盟更强调基本权利的保护，同时关注风险防控，特别是在隐私保护和偏差方面。欧盟出台了人工智能法案，这是全球第一部全面的人工智能法律。我想其他国家应该还没有出台如此全面的人工智能法律，珍妮稍后可以帮我确认一下。另外，中国与其他国家之间的不同还体现在监管执行上。因此制定理念是一方面，有指导方针是另一方面，法律推出又是另一方面，但最关键的是执行。中国在执行方面采取的是一种不同于其他法律法规的严格监管机制。这个机制要求在内容、算法或大语言模型推出之前进行安全评估，这不同于世界上其他国家采取的事后监管模式。

Jeannie Paterson | 珍妮·帕特森:

Can I jump in there? I actually don't think divide falls neatly across democratic and authoritarian governments. Obviously, the approach in China emphasizes socialist values, as Haiqing has mentioned but I think that there's also a divide between countries that are tech-producing and tech-importing. So the EU has famously gone in quite strongly with its AI regulation, both in terms of what we call product safety.

我可以插一句吗？我认为不能简单用民主政府和威权政府这个标准来划分。当然，就像海青提到的，中国采取的方式强调社会主义价值，但是我认为还有一种划分方式，就是以技术生产国和技术进口国划分。欧盟在人工智能监管采取的方式非常强硬，尤其是在产品安全方面。

That's ex ante regulation, making sure that the products meet certain standards before they're released in the market and also ex post liability. EU has a wealth of law, in fact regulating AI. But the EU famously and troublingly to the rest of the world who perhaps has put a brake on that approach; EU is not a centre of innovation in terms of generative AI. The two dynamic nations there are China and the US. And I think that some of the response in the rest of the world that we're seeing now actually comes out of a concern of, they want access to the technology, but they don't want to lose national control, or they've got national security concerns about being reliant on the technology. So as much as that's sort of authoritarian democratic, I think there's a divide in approach according to tech producing and tech importing.

首先是事前监管，也就是在产品进入市场之前确保其符合一系列安全标准。另一个就是事后责任。欧盟实际上已经拥有一套完整的人工智能监管法律体系。不过令人担忧的是，众所周知，欧盟在全球范围内阻止了这种治理方式的发展，但是在生成人工智能创新方面落后于别国。而创新动力的提供来自中国和美国。我认为，世界上其他国家的反应部分是出于以下的担忧：他们希望获得先进技术，但是他们担忧会失去国家自主控制权，或者在国家安全方面过度依赖技术。所以与其说是威权和民主之间的问题，不如说是技术生产国和技术进口国在治理方式上的不同。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

Well, if we then kind of narrow down on that a little bit more. You mentioned earlier the ASEAN countries, if we just look at some of those. Is there a generalization we can make to their approach? Is it a kind of a US approach of shackles off, or are they putting in some regulatory approaches at the national level that can be seen as practical?

我们可以再缩小讨论范围。你刚才提到了东盟国家，如果我们仅关注这些国家，他们是否存在治理共同点？是否同美国一样开放创新，或者是否在他们自己国家层面落实一些监管机制？

Jeannie Paterson | 珍妮·帕特森：

Well, the ASEAN has always been interesting as a regulatory entity or a grouping because it has an ASEAN approach, which is not top-down law. It's kind of collaboration between independent nation states. So ASEAN itself has released guidance on AI, on safe and ethical AI. And then the individual countries are left to respond in the way in which they implement and respond to that guidance.

东盟这个例子挺有意思的。作为一个监管实体，它不是自上而下的法律体系，而是有一套自己的治理方式，更多的是主权国家之间的协作与协调。因此，东盟推出过人工智能安全与伦理的相关指导方针，但如何落实以及如何回应这些方针取决于各个成员国。

But I think the common thread across those countries is at the moment we see a lot of soft law, which is guidance. And as was mentioned before, almost no hard law in terms of rules applying to AI itself. But interestingly, in those countries, we're also seeing some regulatory responses to the risks of AI, and in particular the risks of manipulation of democratic processes. And Singapore would be the leader there. Singapore, interestingly, has an act—the protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act, which responds to that threat of AI and online disinformation, even though they don't have an AI law and in fact have this sort of soft law approach of balancing innovation and safety.

不过我们可以看到一个共同点哈——目前这些国家主要依靠一些软性法规，或政策指引吧，来规范人工智能的使用，但就像之前提到的，真正具有法律约束力的硬性法规还基本没有出台。不过有趣的是，这些国家也开始针对人工智能带来的风险做出一些监管回应，特别是针对让人工智能操纵民主进程的风险。新加坡在这方面走在前列。比如说，很有意思的是，新加坡有一部叫做《预防网络虚假信息与操纵法》的法案，它正是为了应对人工智能及网络虚假信息的威胁而制定的。尽管他们还没有专门针对人工智能的法律，但实际上他们制定的这种指导性法规，既能保障创新，又能保护安全。

Haiqing Yu | 于海青：

And I'd just add on that Sami. Now that we talk about Singapore, I actually have also been watching what Singapore is doing in the AI regulation sphere. And I agree with Jeannie on Singapore's pragmatism. You know, it doesn't really comply or copy any other countries, whether it's the US, EU or China; it actually takes its own very neutral approach. I think Singapore represents Asia's rising digital pragmatism. It's trying to hedge between the two AI superpowers, but trying to ensure it has its own control and the digital sovereignty.

萨米，我想再补充一点。既然你提到了新加坡，我其实一直在关注他们在人工智能监管领域的动作。我很赞同珍妮对新加坡务实主义的看法。新加坡并没有去完全照搬其他国家比如美国、欧盟或中国的模式，而是走上了一条相对中立的道路。我认为新加坡代表了亚洲数字务实主义的崛起。它一方面在两大人工智能强国之间寻求平衡，另一方面又在积极维护自身的控制权和数字主权。

You know, it comes down to the AI, the philosophical approach that Asian countries have taken to AI and the technology, as we can see in the West--I'm not using it as an absolute case--AI is usually framed as a threat. People look at AI as a black box, thinking about the potential risk that needs to be regulated.

归根结底，这与哲学层面上亚洲国家对人工智能及相关技术的态度有关。在西方，当然不是绝对的啊，人工智能常被视为威胁。人们认为人工智能是“黑箱”，他们关注的是需要得到管控的潜在风险。

But you look across Asia in general, whether it's East Asia or Southeast Asia, which I've been looking at mostly, you can see a very different ethos dominates, very pragmatic. And you think about Japan, for example, that kind of animism and has always been its history. Machines and nature have always been like humans having souls, part of the human society. And then you think about Confucianism and also Buddhism and all the communitarianism in the Southeast Asia, for example, the kind of technology and the humans are never posed as opposite to each other. They are always helping out each other, being part of it.

但放眼整个亚洲，无论是东亚还是我主要研究的东南亚，主流思想与西方截然不同，非常务实。比如日本，一直都有泛灵论的思想，他们认为机器、自然和人类一样都拥有灵魂，都是人类社会的一部分。再看儒家思想、佛教思想，以及东南亚社会社群主义的传统，在这些文化里，人与科技从来不是对立面，而是相辅相成、彼此依存的。

You know, that kind of AI approach has been also applied into how Asian countries view technology and view the role that technologies play in their society, including AI and the generative AI. That's why I think that kind of very pragmatic approach has been driven how they regulate, if they are going to regulate AI.

亚洲各国看待人工智能的方式也影响着他们如何对待科技，决定了这些包括人工智能和生成式人工智能在内的科学技术在社会中扮演什么角色。正因如此，这种务实的态度驱动着他们制定人工智能监管政策，当然，如果他们打算进行监管的话。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

Well, China was the first to or one of the first to bring binding regulation on generative AI with its interim measures for the management of generative AI services, which came into force in mid-2023. Can you summarize for us how the regulations work and how effective they've been?

说到监管，中国是最早对生成式人工智能实施约束性监管的国家之一，他们的《生成式人工智能服务管理暂行办法》2023 年中期生效。你能帮我们总结一下这部法规的主要内容，以及它的实施效果如何吗？

Haiqing Yu | 于海青：

Yes. China has been trying to regulate AI since 2017. Actually, when it has its first AI policy, but then subsequently in the following years, we've seen a number of policies in relation to AI and also synthetic content. In 2021, we have the regulation on recommendation algorithms. And also in 2022 there was a rule on deep synthesis, which means synthetically generated content, particularly videos and audios. And then in 2023, we have seen the new rules on the generative AI. So across all the different regulations the policies we see common themes.

当然可以。其实从 2017 年起中国就开始尝试规范人工智能了，当时发布了第一份人工智能政策。此后几年，中国陆续出台了多项涉及人工智能和合成内容的政策。2021 年出台了有关推荐算法的规定，2022 年则推出了深度合成管理条例，也就是针对人工智能生成的内容，尤其是视频、音频的法规。到了 2023 年，中国又进一步出台了生成式人工智能的新规。纵观这些政策与法规，我们能发现一些共同点。

I've been looking at how the policy has been made. Usually, China has been looked at as a kind of centralizing, top-down authoritarian country, as Jeannie has pointed out in this sphere, we shouldn't be talking about the binary approach. We need to look at how policies are made involving different actors. In fact, I've been seeing how the Chinese policy has been rolled out in a very collaborative, both top-down but also bottom-up approach and the iterative approach as well. 我一直在观察中国的政策是如何制定的。外界通常把中国视为中央集权、自上而下的威权国家，但在 AI 监管这一领域，就像珍妮指出的那样，我们其实不能用二元对立的方式去理解。我们需要了解相关各方是如何参与政策制定的。事实上，我看到的是，中国的政策制定更像是高度协作的过程——既有自上而下的指令推进，也有自下而上的反馈，是一个不断调整、渐进迭代的过程。

And then more importantly, they take a differentiated approach, dividing, for example, we look at algorithms. You think about, one is a content recommending algorithm. The other is task automation algorithms. And then there are also other different kinds of algorithms. You can't have one rule that that applies to all. So they have different differentiated approach. Or we call that tiered approach to regulate algorithms. And similarly that applies to AI and the generative AI. So across all these, one, we have the kind of tiered differentiated approach depending on what kind of area, whether it's consumer facing or political content related stuff or not.

更重要的是，他们采取了一种差异化的做法进行了分类，比如，让我们来看看算法。你想想，一种是根据内容推荐算法，另一种是任务自动化算法，还有其他不同种类的算法。你不能所有情况都套用一种规则。所以他们采取了差异化的做法，或者我们称之为分级的方法来监管算法。同样地，这种方法也适用于人工智能和生成式人工智能。因此，在所有这些领域中，他们会根据不同的领域采取分层监管的差异化方法，例如，是否面向消费者或者是否涉及政治内容——这些都会影响监管的层级与方式。

And then there's also information control. That's the second key aspect I wanted to point out. As I said, whether it's from the internet platform or the platform you're on, the AI driven technological wireless era, we can see the information control has been the central goal for all across all the different policy papers. They contain many other notable provisions, of course. But the regulations, for example, the deep synthesis regulation requires the platforms to and also tech companies to register their algorithms, the recommendation algorithms similarly with generative AI with large language models and in the same kind of registry body is now requiring tech companies to register their algorithms.

接下来我想要强调的第二个关键点信息控制。正如我之前所提到的，无论是互联网平台还是你所在的平台，在由人工智能驱动的无线科技时代，我们可以看到信息控制一直是所有不同政策文件的核心目标。当然，这些文件中还包含许多其他值得注意的规定。但举例来说，像《深度合成管理规定》这样的法规，要求平台和科技公司注册他们的算法。同样，对于生成式人工智能与大型语言模型，也要求科技公司必须在统一的算法备案体系中注册他们的算法。

So that kind of pre-empt, preapproval, pre-assessment security assessment before rolling out is very unique to the Chinese case. Of course, if you look at Deep Seek, for example, as an example of Chinese large language models, and then you can see the content is regulated, it's censored. And then because they have to comply with the Chinese government's rules to ensure that model output is true and accurate. But who defines what is true? What is accurate? So when it comes to that content it's top-down. But when it comes to the market innovation, particularly using open source kind of platform, joining the open source projects globally, that's a different topic.

这种在产品上线前进行预备案、预审批和预安全评估的制度，是中国特有的一种做法。以中国的大型语言模型 DeepSeek 为例，它的内容是受到监管和审查的，因为他的内容必须遵守中国政府的规定，要确保模型输出的内容是真实且准确的。但问题是，谁来定义什么是真实，什么是准确呢？因此它生成的内容所受到的监管是自上而下的；而在市场创新层面，尤其是在利用开源平台、参与全球开源项目，又是另一种情况了。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

Well, I wanted a bit of clarity on that because you mentioned Deep Seek and it's described outside of China as being open source. But is that accurate? Can you explain the difference between open weights and open source in this context?

我想请您再稍微解释一下，因为您刚刚提到了 DeepSeek。在中国以外的地方，DeepSeek 常被称为“开源”软件，但这个说法真的准确吗？您能不能简单说一说，在这个语境下，开放权重和开源到底有什么区别？

Haiqing Yu | 于海青：

Yeah, there has been a confusion here because strictly speaking, Deep Seek is not open source. It's open weights. Open weights actually means it's a trend. Parameters are made public. You can download it, you can run it, you can tweak it. You can fine tune it. But you don't know how it's made. You don't know the training code or the database.

可以，这两者确实是比较容易混淆的。因为严格来说，DeepSeek 并不是“开源”软件，而是一种开放权重。所谓的开放权重，其实是一种趋势——意思是模型的参数是公开的。你可以下载、运行甚至稍微改动调整一下都可以。但是你不知道他是怎么训练出来的，更不会知道它的训练代码或者数据库是什么样的。

And then similarly, you know, Meta's llama also can be called open weights. I'll just give you an example. This is what I explained to my students. What's the difference between open weights and open source? Just think about open weights as a ready-made meal. So the chef cooked the meal, brought it to you, and you can add a little bit of salt, pepper to your taste. You can change the plating. I don't like your plate, I change, I have my own plate, but you don't know how it's made. You don't know what ingredients are there, but open source is different. Open source opens everything. Not just the training parameters, the codes, but also the data sets. Just like HelloFresh for example, right? You have the recipes, you have ingredients, and you are told how to cook it. You can even use the recipe to run your own restaurant. You can make a business out of it, but you can't do that with open weights.

同样，像是 Meta Llama 这样的语言模型也可以被称为开放权重。我给我的学生举过这样一个例子，来解释开放权重和开源的区别：你可以把开放权重想象成一份已经做好的饭菜。厨师已经把菜做好端到你面前了，你可以根据自己的口味往里面加点盐、胡椒；还可以换个盘子摆盘。比如我不喜欢你的盘子，我就换成我自己的盘子。但问题是你并不知道这道菜究竟是怎么做出来的，也不知道用了哪些食材。而开源就完全不同了。他是完全公开的，不仅仅公开训练的参数，就连代码和数据集也是公开的。就像 HelloFresh 这样的配餐公司一样。你拿到手的有食谱、食材，还会告诉你具体的做法。你甚至可以拿着这份食谱自己开一家餐厅，做点生意，但开放权重就完全做不到这样。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

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I'm Sami Shah and I'm joined by Professor Haiqing Yu of RMIT University and by Professor Jeannie Paterson of the University of Melbourne. We're talking about how governments, particularly those in Asia, view and manage the rapid advance of AI technologies.

我是萨米·沙。今天的嘉宾是皇家墨尔本理工大学的于海青教授和墨尔本的珍妮·帕特森教授。我们将探讨各国政府，尤其是亚洲地区的政府，如何看待和管理人工智能技术的飞速发展。

Jeannie, moving away from China to the rest of Asia, then we've got recently announced massive investment in AI development by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. We've got Japan and these kind of places. If you look at some places like the Middle East, does that also come accompanied by appropriate regulatory or governance models? Do they know what they're getting into here?

珍妮，我们把视线从中国转向亚洲其他地区。最近，沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋都宣布了对人工智能发展进行大规模投资，日本等地也是如此。如果我们观察像中东这样的地区，他们在大力投资的同时，是否也配备了相应的监管或治理模式呢？他们是否清楚自己正在涉足的是一个怎样的领域？

Jeannie Paterson | 珍妮·帕特森:

Well, I think the Middle East is very keen to jump on the AI bandwagon. And we saw that with the visit from President Trump to Saudi Arabia. But I think we need to wait and see in that space about what's going to happen? Because what I'm going to say is that AI regulation is not just having a law about AI, it's having a whole regulatory apparatus with regulator expertise which is able to oversee and respond to AI development, and I haven't seen that in the Middle East yet.

我认为中东地区非常渴望搭上人工智能这班快车。我们之前也看到特朗普总统访问沙特时的情况。但我认为，在那个领域，我们还需要观望事态如何发展。因为我想说的是，人工智能监管并不仅仅是出台一部关于人工智能的法律，它需要建立一整套监管机制，包括拥有能够监督和应对人工智能发展的监管机构与专业知识。而我目前在中东地区还未看到这一点。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙:

What about places like Japan? We've discussed that as well a little bit, particularly the soul in the machine. How have they approached something like regulation on AI development?

那么像日本这样的地方呢？我们之前也稍微讨论过，特别是关于“机器中的灵魂”这个概念。他们是如何对人工智能发展制定相关法规的？

Jeannie Paterson | 珍妮·帕特森:

So Japan is really interesting actually. Because Japan is, as was mentioned, a country which has embraced technology and embraced the relationship between technology and humans in a quite unique and distinct way and has gone for a famously light touch approach to regulation—voluntary risk mitigation. And we might from the West look at that and go, well, that seems very soft, but that's the way the Japanese legal system works. There's a great deal of collaboration between government, industry and different sectors of the industry to respond to risk while also prioritizing innovation.

日本的情况其实非常有趣。正如前面提到的，日本是一个拥抱技术、并以相当独特的方式接纳技术与人类关系的国家，并且以其著名的轻度监管方式而闻名——即自愿风险缓释。我们西方人可能会觉得这种方式似乎过于宽松，但日本的法律体系就是这样运作的。在日本，政府、产业界以及产业内不同部门之间存在大量合作，共同应对风险，同时优先考虑创新。

It's quite a unique ecosystem, so I think we shouldn't see that approach as in some way ineffective. I think we see it as regionally specific, given there's a country that already has a reasonably high emission of technology, but also is an ageing population and pretty keen, I suspect, to make use of some of the things that technology can offer to responding to an ageing population.

这是一个相当独特的生态系统。因此，我认为我们不应将这种方式视为某种程度上的无效。我们应将其视为具有地域特色的做法，考虑到日本本身已拥有较高的技术普及度，同时面临人口老龄化问题，并且我猜想，他们非常渴望利用技术所能提供的某些解决方案来应对人口老龄化挑战。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

Both Japan and India, though, have so far shied away from really hardcore legislative measures. 不过，无论是日本还是印度，到目前为止似乎都在回避真正强硬的立法措施。

Jeannie Paterson | 珍妮·帕特森：

I know, but we don't need hardcore legislative measures called an AI act to have hardcore regulation of AI. The point is that AI is a thing that is subject to any law that applies in the nation state. So if you have a country that has, for example, good consumer protection law, good financial services law, good workplace protection law, then those laws are carrying a lot of the weight of responding to AI. Now there may be gaps. That's one of the things Australia has been thinking about. Whether our legal regime has gaps in it that necessitate an AI specific law. It's one of the things the UK and Canada are thinking about.

我明白，但我们要知道，并非必须有一部名为“人工智能法案”的强硬立法，才能实现对人工智能的有效监管。关键在于，人工智能作为一种事物，受制于国家内任何适用的法律。因此，如果一个国家拥有健全的消费者保护法、完善的金融服务法、有效的职场保护法，那么这些法律在很大程度上就承担起了应对人工智能风险的责任。当然，可能存在监管空白——这也正是澳大利亚一直在思考的问题之一：我们的法律体系是否存在需要专门的人工智能法律来填补的空白。英国和加拿大也在考虑这个问题。

But if you have a country that has a healthy legal system and active regulators who have expertise and resources, you actually can have a country that is very responsive to the risks of AI. And you see that happening in a number of countries across the region. They don't have AI laws, but they have laws about misinformation. What are we most worried about with generative AI? Misinformation. So I think we need to be careful about assuming that it's only an AI law that can respond to these risks that we're talking about.

但是，如果一个国家拥有健全的法律体系，以及具备专业知识和资源、并能积极行动的监管机构，那么这个国家实际上完全有能力有效应对人工智能的风险。我们在该地区的许多国家都看到了这种情况。它们可能没有专门的人工智能法律，但它们有关于错误信息的法律。而我们目前对生成式人工智能最担忧的是什么？正是错误信息。所以，我认为我们需要谨慎，不应想当然地认为只有专门的人工智能法才能应对我们正在讨论的这些风险。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

Can you tell us a little bit about the Hiroshima reporting framework as a recent international initiative? It was mentioned earlier, but I'd like to get into some of the details around it now.

你能简单介绍一下“广岛报告框架”（Hiroshima reporting framework）吗？它是一个新的国际倡议，前面我们提到了它，我想深入了解它的具体内容。

Jeannie Paterson | 珍妮·帕特森：

Well, I guess we've been speaking about countries, locally or domestically. What is China doing? What is Singapore doing? What is Japan doing? What is India doing? And recognizing that actually those countries responses differ according to their immersion in technology, the technology they themselves are producing and their existing legal systems. But realistically, given the global dominance of a few tech providers, the international cooperation is going to be crucial. If we really do want to have a response to some of those risks of AI. And I'm talking about those sort of profound and existential risks. So issues about intellectual property and what happens to people's ownership of their creative outputs in an age of generative AI. I'm talking about disinformation. I'm talking about scams, and I'm also talking about really aggressive hacking and cyber-attacks on national infrastructure. Now all of those things happen outside nation states, and therefore a response relies on cooperation between nation states. Now, what the Hiroshima Declaration tries to do is compile a resource about AI risk that can be used to prompt that collaboration between nation states.

珍妮·帕特森：好的，我想我们一直在讨论各国在本地或国内层面采取的措施。中国在做什么？新加坡在做什么？日本在做什么？印度在做什么？同时我们也意识到，实际上，这些国家的应对措施因其技术普及程度、自主研发的技术水平以及现行法律体系的差异而有所不同。但现实情况是，由于少数科技巨头在全球的主导地位，国际合作显得尤为关键。如果我们真的想要有效应对人工智能带来的那些深刻而关乎人类存续的风险，就必须正视以下几个问题：第一，知识产权问题，生成式人工智能时代人们对其创作成果所有权的归属问题；第二，虚假信息传播与诈骗问题；第三，针对国家基础设施的网络攻击和网络战。所有这些风险都超越国家边界，因此只有依靠国家间的合作才能真正应对。现在，“广岛报告框架”试图做的是汇编一份关于人工智能风险的资源清单，以此促进各国之间的协作。

I personally—and I can't wait to see Haiqing's response to this—I personally am pessimistic about the likelihood of international cooperation on AI risk. I just don't think we're going to get it. China and the and the US are in a standoff. And they're the big players in this space. What I think we'll see, is either domestic initiatives like we've just heard about China or regional initiatives. We've talked about some of the things that are happening, for example, in ASEAN. I think India is really interesting, given India's sort of talent in the engineering space about what they'll do. I think we still need to see that. But I think we're more likely to see regional responses, notwithstanding the global aspirations of the of the Hiroshima document.

不过我迫不及待想听听海青的看法，我个人对国际社会在人工智能风险治理上达成合作的可能性持悲观态度。我认为，这种合作几乎不可能实现。中美两国正处于对峙状态，而它们是该领域的两大主导力量。我认为未来要么出现类似中国近期宣布的国内监管措施，要么是区域性合作方案。我们刚才谈到的东盟，就是一个正在推进的典型例子。印度的情况也值得关注。鉴于其在工程领域的人才优势，它的下一步行动令人期待。虽然“广岛报告框架”展现了全球愿景，但我们更可能看到的是区域层面的应对模式。

Haiqing Yu | 于海青：

I'll just add a little bit on that. I don't hold a positive view on the global collaboration in AI governance, particularly given the increasing tension between the two AI superpowers and the delinking drive that has been going on for a few years. But I do hold a very hopeful view about Asia. I think the future of AI development is in Asia. It's in the Global South because the future of the generative AI battle is not about who has the best or the largest large language models. I think it's about innovation diffusion. It's about diffusion and application.

我再补充一点。我对全球人工智能治理的合作前景并不乐观，尤其考虑到两个 AI 超级大国（中美）之间日益紧张的关系，以及近年来持续推进的脱钩趋势。但我对亚洲的发展前景充满希望。我认为，人工智能的未来在亚洲，在全球南方。生成式 AI 的未来之争，不再取决于谁拥有性能最强或规模最大的语言模型。我认为关键在于创新的扩散能力，即技术的传播与应用。

So Asia has the largest population but also the largest young population who are digitally savvy. And then Asia is also very open-minded. You look across the countries in the Asia Pacific region, young people in the region are very open-minded and they like to try new things. And then the governments actually have been taking a very hybrid way. As I said earlier, they've taken a very pragmatic way in trying to hedge between US-China Rivalry.

亚洲不仅拥有全球最大的人口基数，更拥有数量庞大的精通数字技术的年轻一代。与此同时，亚洲社会思想开放，放眼亚太地区，年轻一代普遍思想开放且乐于尝试新事物。而各国政府也采取了务实的策略。正如我先前所言，各国在应对中美竞争时采取务实策略。

And then so the future of AI, as I said, is about who is able to diffuse, innovate, just like, you know, the seedling who are able to make sure the seeds grow vertically, not just horizontally. So the vertical AI. In the region will see Asia playing a greater role. While they talk about data localisation, AI sovereignty, which of course, they all do. But ASEAN has a very effective regional body will play and has been playing a very important role in AI regulation and that kind of body that people that countries can work together is a very good model. And I can see the regional collaboration among smaller, groups of countries, but internationally that's probably too hard.

因此，人工智能的未来，正如我所说，取决于谁能实现创新扩散。就像幼苗不仅能横向生长，更能纵向茁壮成长。这种纵向发展的人工智能，在亚洲将扮演越来越重要的角色。尽管各国都在讨论数据本地化、人工智能主权等问题，但东盟作为一个高效的区域组织，在人工智能监管领域发挥着关键作用。这种国家间协作机制堪称典范。我认为，未来在区域合作层面，特别是小规模国家集团之间，实现合作是可行的，但国际层面的协作恐怕难度较大。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

Jeannie, going off of that pessimistic note, then how likely are things like voluntary frameworks, codes of conduct, guiding principle statements, and vaguely worded national strategy papers going to get us to a robust regulatory environment for the common good?

珍妮，在刚才所表达的那种悲观基调下，那些自愿性框架、行为准则、指导性原则声明，以及措辞模糊的国家战略文件，真的有可能让我们建立起一个以公共利益为导向的健全监管体系吗？

Jeannie Paterson | 珍妮·帕特森：

Well, I'm going to come back to this point about what are the risks of AI that we're worried about. and riffing off Haiqing's sort of vision of a sapling able to move with the changing environment and changing winds. I think the regional approach, at least the ASEAN regional approach—and of course, every country in ASEAN is distinct and unique—is perhaps to have, at the moment anyway, voluntary guidelines. But we are seeing laws on specific issues of concern which were minted. Data sovereignty is going to be a big issue. And you can see countries responding to that concern of where is the data that's being used to both train the AI and also target some of the outputs of it. So data sovereignty is going to be really important.

我想回到刚才那个问题：我们所担忧的人工智能风险究竟是什么？借用海青的比喻，人工智能就像一棵能随环境与风向变化灵活生长的小树苗。我认为至少在东盟区域内，目前的做法仍然以自愿性准则为主，当然东盟各国也都有各自的国情。不过，我们也看到各国陆续出台了针对特定问题的新法规。其中数据主权将成为一项重大议题。可以看到，各国都在回应这样的担忧，那就是那些用于训练人工智能的数据，以及人工智能输出所依据的数据，到底该存放在哪儿。因此，数据主权会变得愈发重要。

And I'm just going to reiterate the misinformation/disinformation piece is a is an ongoing concern of countries. Recently, KPMG and Melbourne University put out a report on trustworthy AI. And they asked people in nations across the world what they were worried about with AI, and it was actually the loss of interpersonal relationships, the loss of the human touch. And it was misinformation, disinformation, destabilising governments, and that's governments, whatever their political persuasion.

我还想再强调一下虚假信息与错误信息的问题，这也是各国持续关注的焦点。最近，毕马威与墨尔本大学联合发布了一份关于可信人工智能的报告。他们调查了世界各地的人们对人工智能有哪些担忧，发现人们最担心的其实是人与人关系的疏离，也就是人情味的缺失。此外就是对虚假信息与错误信息的忧虑，以及人工智能可能导致政府不稳定，无论这些政府的政治立场如何。

So I think you're right. I think we've got a lot of high faluting statements about ethical AI. But I think through the region there's also movement to respond to concerns about misinformation and disinformation. That's where we may see some cooperation and regional initiatives, for example, on watermarking or standards about identifying synthetic content. And I think that and protecting children would be another one actually (from harmful content).

所以我认为你说得对。关于人工智能伦理确实有许多华而不实的宣言。但在东盟地区，我们也能看到各国在应对虚假与错误信息问题上的实际行动。我们可以期待，未来可能会出现一些区域层面的合作与倡议，比如在合成内容识别领域推行水印技术或制定标准。此外，保护儿童免受有害内容影响也是重要议题。

So I think we may see movement on those sort of issues rather than a global governance framework or an overarching governance framework. That's not a bad solution, actually; because as I keep saying, if you've got strong national laws in other areas, then those will pick up a lot of the slack. What I would be looking for is more investment actually in regulatory expertise.

因此我认为，相较于建立全球或者是全局性的治理框架，未来我们更有可能在这些具体议题上率先取得进展。其实这也不是坏事。正如我常说的，只要一个国家在其他领域拥有健全的法律，那么这些法律就能在一定程度上填补人工智能领域的监管空白。我更希望看到的是在监管能力方面有更多投入。

So I think, one of the things we're starting to see is AI safety authorities or AI commissions which don't have legal lawmaking power but are able to provide really useful and profound guidance to government and regulators and lawmakers on AI risk.

一些人工智能安全机构或委员会开始出现，这些组织虽没有立法权，但是能为政府、监管者和立法者提供深入有效的指导，帮助他们理解并应对人工智能风险。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

Is there a lesson to be learned here from the climate change regulation, or the kind of stuttering approach to the pretenses towards international cooperation that never really implemented in any practical, strategic way? Can governments try to see from the failures of that successes that might be applied to AI regulation?

那我们能否从气候变化监管的历程中得到一些启示？比如，那种试图推动国际合作却始终难以真正落地的、断断续续的努力。各国政府是否能从这些失败与有限的成功中，总结出一些可以应用到人工智能监管上的经验？

Jeannie Paterson | 珍妮·帕特森：

Well, I would say the problem with climate change and the reason why we've had so little action is it's far away. People keep saying, oh, well, it's not happening now. And yet the initiatives and the interventions that we need to respond to climate change are now in fact, there were probably ten, 20 years ago. Where I think for governments, I suspect governments are very aware of the risks to them of AI, the benefits, but also the risk. So that's why I think we're seeing action in that space of online safety misinformation combined with Haiqing's innovative, flexible, unique approach. And I'm sure you have she has more to say on this.

我认为气候变化的问题在于它离我们太遥远了。正是因为如此，我们迟迟没有采取实质行动。人们总是觉得：“啊，气候现在又没有剧变。”然而，我们应对气候变化需要的干预措施，其实就该在现在，甚至早在十几二十几年前就付诸行动。而我认为，政府非常清楚人工智能可以给自身所带来的风险。当然也有收益，但风险不容忽视。这也是为什么我们能看到各国正在结合海青所倡导的那种创新、灵活而独特的治理方式，在网络安全与虚假信息领域采取行动。我相信她对此还有更多的看法。

Haiqing Yu | 于海青：

Of course. You know, as you said, when it comes to climate change, we haven't seen the effective international collaboration or coordination. But when it comes to smaller, I wouldn't say smaller when we come to vertical problems, specific problems like misinformation; we have seen international collaboration. There are international governing bodies for misinformation and for fact checkers, for example, and Taiwan, you know, I have colleagues doing research in Taiwan about misinformation. And there's a vibrant civil society there. And civil society organizations have been very actively involved with regional but also international fact checking organizations and that kind of coordination, ground up civil society, living up kind of initiative will be where we see international collaboration happening.

当然了。正如你所说，在气候变化问题上，我们至今还没有看到有效的国际协作或协调机制。但在一些更“垂直”的议题上——我并不是说它们更小，而是更具体的问题，比如虚假信息，国际层面的合作其实已经出现。例如，已经有针对虚假信息和事实核查的国际治理组织。以台湾为例，我有同事在那研究虚假信息问题。台湾的公民社会非常活跃，许多民间组织积极参与区域性乃至国际性的事实核查合作。这种自下而上、由公民社会推动的协调形式，正是我们能够看到国际合作真正发挥作用的地方。

And then and I also wanted to add when it comes to Asia, when I was talking about Asia, would be the future of the AI battle ground, also because, as Jeannie pointed out, Asia, it's so diverse. Even the ASEAN countries have such huge diversity in terms of language, culture and also the national context. But we also see, because of the diversity and also developmental need, we see the drive for AI for development in those countries. Of course, you know, we see the international tech companies and the governments, national and international NGOs being active in the region. At the same time, we see regional local actors, including in startups, be playing an increasing role in rolling out their local language specific large language models that serve local needs and that kind of lightweight but localized models that target to specific cultural and infrastructural realities is where innovations happen. And that kind of innovation is where the regional collaborations happen.

另外我还想补充一点：当我们谈到亚洲时，我认为这里将成为未来人工智能竞争的主要战场。正如珍妮刚才提到的，亚洲本身极具多样性。即使在东盟国家之间，也存在显著的语言、文化和国家背景差异。正因为如此，再加上各国的发展需求不同，我们能看到这些国家普遍都在以“发展导向”推动人工智能的应用。当然，国际科技公司、各国政府以及国内外的非政府组织都在该地区积极活动。与此同时，我们也看到区域内的本地参与者，包括初创企业，正在扮演越来越重要的角色。他们开发了许多针对本地语言 and 需求的轻量化大型语言模型，更贴合各自的文化语境和基础设施条件。正是在这种本地化创新中，我们看到区域性合作正在不断展开。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

So final question to both of you then, Jeannie, starting with you. How do governments best perform the balancing act of getting aboard the AI bandwagon, while maintaining a level of regulatory control that serves a national public interest? Is the model, the China one where you put in the strict censorship up at the start of the system and then create a kind of open source slash open weight version, or the Singapore model, which seems to have more of a balanced approach. Or then there's the India and Japan approach, which is fairly hands off. Which one is the most practical for many Asian countries?

那么，最后一个问题请两位回答。珍妮，我们先从你开始。各国政府该如何在搭上人工智能“快车”的同时，保持符合国家公共利益的监管力度？哪一种模式更实际——是像中国那样在系统初期就设置严格的内容审查，再推出某种“开源”或“开放权重”版本？还是像新加坡那样采取更平衡的方式？又或者像印度、日本这样相对放任的做法？

Jeannie Paterson | 珍妮·帕特森:

Oh, if I could answer that, I'd have a lot of money, I suspect, because I'd be off working for a consulting company. But I actually think the answer has just been given to us, which is the ASEAN countries and the Asian region, the countries are proudly diverse. And one of the initiatives I'd agree with that's really interesting is this idea of sovereign language models, which support and buttress those regional strengths. And also kind of loosen the hold of, I think, the international tech companies to some extent, but more globally, I would say that that the issue for most countries is that the technology is changing really fast. And one of the problems with writing laws, is the law. Hard law is just that. It's hard. It's not necessarily adaptive. So this sort of softly-softly approach on one view looks weak, but on another view responds to change in technology.

如果我能回答这个问题，大概早就去咨询公司工作了。但我想，答案其实已经在刚才的讨论中出现了——那就是东盟国家及更广义的亚洲地区，这些国家都以自身的多样性为荣。一个非常有意思的趋势是“主权语言模型”（sovereign language models）的出现，它们既强化了地区自身的技术优势，又在一定程度上削弱了国际科技巨头的垄断影响。从更宏观的角度看，对大多数国家而言，最大的挑战在于技术更新的速度实在太快。而法律，尤其是“硬法”，往往相对僵化，缺乏足够的灵活性。因此，那种“温和渐进”的监管方式，从某种角度看似乎软弱，但从另一角度看，其实更能顺应技术变革。

And I'll say again, what countries who want to retain control of technology need. And I think there are risks in the rollout of technology. I'm not saying there aren't risks. I think there are genuine risks to human thriving, to democratic systems. But if governments want to retain oversight or influence, they need to embrace that community, inclusive approach, one; and two, they need to invest in training, literacy, expertise in AI so that their regulators, their lawmakers, the community have a say in what is happening and have the capacity to draw the line where the technology is not operating in the national interest.

我想再次强调，对于希望保持科技主导权的国家来说，必须做到两点：第一，采取一种包容、以公众为核心的参与式治理；第二，加大投入，培养人工智能方面的专业人才与监管素养。这样，监管机构、立法者和普通公众都能理解技术、参与讨论，并在必要时划清界限，当技术的运作不再符合国家利益时，能够及时作出反应。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙:

Haiqing?

海青?

Haiqing Yu | 于海青：

Okay, just to reiterate, there's no good or bad at this stage. As I pointed out earlier, that Asia has taken a very pragmatic approach to governance, technological governance. Today we're talking about AI tomorrow, we don't know. We're talking about Gen AI agent, and then we don't know what else will come along the way around the corner because technological sphere is changing so fast every week there's something new. Right? So the kind of flexible, literate and collaborative approach that Asian countries have taken will ensure that they are able to keep up with the changes. And also, the localized approach also will ensure that they remain retain data, but also digital sovereignty, instead of catering to the US or the Chinese, tech hegemony.

我想再次重申，现在谈“好”或“坏”都为时尚早。正如我先前提到的，亚洲在科技治理上一直采取务实的态度。今天我们讨论的是人工智能，明天可能就会是生成式 AI 代理，再往后谁也不知道还会出现什么新事物。技术发展太快，几乎每一周都有新的变化。正因如此，亚洲国家所采用的那种灵活、具备技术素养并重视协作的方式，正是它们能够跟上时代步伐的关键。与此同时，本地化的治理模式也让它们既能保留数据，又能维护数字主权，而不至于陷入美中两国的科技霸权之下。

And I would also want to add, the open source movement will be an opportunity for lots of middle to lower income countries in the region because, to develop, you know, powerful large language models requires lots of compute power data, but also talent. And then not many of these countries have all three. And then the only there are only two countries who can do this, right? US and China. But what else? What would the rest of the world do? Of course, there are still opportunities. Asia has the largest number of data centers for, for example, in the world. And then so data center as the physical infrastructure for generative AI. And then that's only just one example. When we look at AI governance from the infrastructure perspective, and then how they govern the data centers to ensure not just data localization, but also in terms of energy reservation that has environmental impact, right. So that, you know, it's not just we're talking about technology. We also talk about climate change. When you think about physical infrastructure, the material infrastructure of AI. 我还想补充一点：开源运动为本地区的中低收入国家带来了新的机遇。因为要开发强大的大型语言模型，需要巨大的算力、丰富的数据以及高水平的人才——而并非所有国家都具备这三项条件。目前真正能兼备这三者的，恐怕只有美国和中国。那么，其它国家该怎么办呢？当然仍有机会。比如，亚洲拥有全球数量最多的数据中心，它们构成了生成式 AI 的物理基础设施。但这只是其中一个例子。从基础设施角度看，AI 治理不仅要关注数据本地化，还要考虑能源消耗与环境影响，因为这同样关系到气候变化问题。当我们讨论 AI 时，不应只谈技术本身，还要看到其背后的物质与环境维度。

So a lot of Asian countries are not rolling out a specific AI act or anything like that, because you have to look at the whole thing from a holistic perspective, which is, what Asian countries do, they are good at looking things from a holistic perspective rather than just looking at one slice of the cake. They look at the whole cake to say, what do I do with this whole cake?

因此，许多亚洲国家目前并没有急于推出类似《人工智能法》这样的专门立法，因为它们更倾向于从整体出发——这也是亚洲国家的独特优势。它们习惯从全局去思考问题，而不是只盯着其中的一部分。就像看着一个完整的“蛋糕”，然后思考：我要如何处理这整个蛋糕？

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

Our guests have been Professor Jeannie Paterson of the Melbourne Law School and director of the University of Melbourne's Centre for AI and Digital Ethics, and Professor Haiqing Yu of RMIT University's School of Media and Communication and chief investigator for the ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision Making and Society. Thanks to you both.

今天的嘉宾是墨尔本大学法学院教授、人工智能与数字伦理中心主任珍妮·帕特森和皇家墨尔本理工大学传媒与传播学院教授、自动化决策与社会卓越研究中心首席研究员于海青。非常感谢两位的精彩分享。

Haiqing Yu | 于海青：

Thank you so much. It's a pleasure.

非常感谢，这是一次愉快的交流。

Jeannie Paterson | 珍妮·帕特森：

Thank you for a fabulous conversation.

谢谢，这是一场特别棒的交流。

Sami Shah | 萨米·沙：

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